Superpolitik – book review by Iulia Moise: Triumph and strategic failure – leaders, great ambitions of power, and the logic of legitimacy in the order of states and international relations

This approach comes as a natural continuation and culmination of a call made over a decade ago to investigate, meditate, and contribute to that „new type of strategic thinking and action” [1], whose necessity he invoked throughout an impressive political and diplomatic career and an academic and journalistic path in diplomacy, foreign policy analysis, and intelligence.

Superpolitik is a distinct exercise in the application of power.

The first chapter of the book is dedicated to defining the key concept of this work, based on essential clarifications regarding the scope of the term and its differentiation from politics, as well as from the two opposing paradigms in the approach to international politics: realpolitik and idealpolitik.

The vast dual experience as both a theorist and practitioner in the strategic field is the author’s great asset, as George Maior succeeds where many fail, namely in adhering to the essential requirements of a definition, in John Stuart Mill’s [2] understanding: „The simplest and most correct conception of a definition is: a proposition that declares the meaning of a word, namely either the meaning the word usually has or the one the speaker or writer intends to attribute to it.”

Thus, the author provides the reader with a clear and concise definition of the term he invented (which he will operationalize in the following pages): „Superpolitik is a distinct exercise in the application of power.”

The essential conceptual distinction between politics and superpolitik lies in the exceptional context in which the latter manifests: „Superpolitics always appears and expresses itself in an exceptional context: generally (but not necessarily!) a crisis in the natural order of the state or in the international order of states, with inevitable consequences in both planes; a rupture in political-historical evolution, a radical transformation or a return to previous models” (Maior, 2024, p. 8). Thus, the criterion for distinguishing between the two concepts is necessarily the context.

The author’s great merit in the conceptual distinction from realpolitik (power politics) and idealpolitik is that he manages not only to avoid the simplistic approach to political action through the real/ideal-ism opposition [3]—but also to offer an integrative vision of the two seemingly opposing perspectives. Reality cannot be explained solely by appealing to realistic or idealistic principles: if we understand political realism as a search for the factual bases of the political, then the role of the realist ends where idealism begins; ideals cannot replace facts, they overlap with them. If political realism exclusively emphasizes the factual basis of the political, the idealist philosophical school is founded on the principles of the relationship between is and ought, between reality and ideals.

Therefore, for Maior, superpolitik shares common elements with both realpolitk and idealpolitik, but transcends traditional approaches to power. Moreover, the author states that „the logic of superpolitics is transformational, usually non-linear, and, of course, historical”—and here lies the essence of differentiating superpolitk from the concept it draws inspiration from: realpolitik (as the author confesses). Realpolitik lacks the component of destabilization, imbalances, and ruptures, as realpolitik is fundamentally based on a careful calculation of power balances.

The agent of Superpolitik is the statesman, a special type of politician

The following sections aim to operationalize the concept, which emerges from analyzing the logic in which superpolitik appears and expresses itself.

To fully understand the strategic behavior of states, in his book, George Maior draws attention to the need to expand the range of explanations beyond systemic tendencies and consider the role of other variables at the unit level.

Indeed, as Maior aptly captures in his analysis of the superpolitik concept, the constraints of the international system have the greatest impact on the strategic behavior of states. The author shares the neorealist thesis that the global distribution of power acts as a pressure force, but it does not provide exhaustive explanatory power in understanding the relationships that arise between units in the system (states), as state actions are not exclusively determined by trends manifesting within the system.

Moreover, the distribution of capacities is not an exclusively systemic variable, as it depends, in the first instance, on factors at the unit level, being the result of internal processes within states. The structure of the system shapes but does not determine state policy choices. Therefore, internal factors, which are exogenous to the systemic approach of international relations, must also be considered. The world order thus becomes a political and cultural construction. Some states become powerful or fail due to internal processes at the unit level (processes related to the internal structure and functioning of states).

States react not only to security concerns but also to internal pressures, and alongside the distribution of capabilities, George Maior shows that the actions of individual leaders can have a significant impact on state behavior.

This is where superpolitik comes in, as „the agent of its action is the statesman, a special type of politician, that individual endowed or ambitious who, through will and determination, can decisively affect the existing political order, causing essential transformations and new social or geopolitical balances.” Therefore, the author concludes, „excluding the role of the individual in historical analyses can unproductively narrow the theoretical framework of analysis.”

Legitimacy – an indispensable condition for generating Superpolitik

In close connection with the agent of superpolitik’s action, George Maior also discusses the issue of legitimacy in the order of states and international relations. Legitimacy—that quality of power to be accepted based on consent and not force—is crucial in international relations, because the way states justify and support their strategic actions on the international stage directly determines the mechanism by which the international order is established and maintained. Legitimacy thus becomes a power factor in international relations, one of the most important sources of asserting and promoting a state’s interests.

On the other hand, politics always involves choices, and choices depend, among other things, on how the actor is constructed, in other words, on its identity. A state’s strategic behavior is not only defined by interactions with other states but is also constructed within societies, the state itself being a social institution. Therefore, a state’s legitimacy is not only a product of systemic or local „trends” but also comes from the actions of individual leaders.

Legitimacy thus becomes an indispensable condition for the emergence and expression of superpolitik. Major cases of superpolitik in transforming the order of states and international relations are exemplified—great leaders who played a crucial role in shaping strategic history and international relations: from Moses and Octavian Augustus to Charlemagne, Otto von Bismarck, Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, or Jean Monnet.

But how much legitimacy is desirable? George Maior does not overlook in his analysis the ambitions of hyperlegitimacy, and the author’s keen sense excellently captures the fine line separating the effects of legitimacy in the presence or absence of the strategic dimension of politics. As Chapter 3 is suggestively titled, history is full of examples of „hyperlegitimacy (anti-strategic) and hyperstrategic in the internal and external order of states,” those moments when political action driven by ambitions of or conquest and domination completely ignored the need to be anchored in legitimacy.

As Maior emphasizes, pure legitimacy, without the strategic dimension of politics, inevitably creates an anti-strategic environment that ultimately favors forms of instability, because „when ambitions are guided solely by the value-based, justice-oriented, and ideological aspect of politics (sometimes without historical and material support), anti-strategic behaviors appear, those excessive behaviors that leave no room for strategic flexibility and, ultimately, a rationality of politics.”

Does superpolitik resemble strategy or politics more?

Although George Maior opines that superpolitics does not entirely overlap with strategy, if we were to interpret the concept in the broader context of decision-making processes, superpolitics can be understood as a model of behavior. Therefore, the author notes: „superpolitics is, willy-nilly, consciously or not, also about strategy.”

The only solid foundation for the emergence of superpolitik is to have a clear picture of national interests correlated with an assumed vision based on a rational calculation that considers both one’s own capacities but does not overlook normative factors. Therefore, the author emphasizes, „superpolitik is not reduced to power and the calculation of power, to pure strategy, but includes ideas or concepts of legitimacy, ethical models, ideologies emerged to provide a qualitative dimension to the political order.”

Superpolitics thus imposes, above all, a perfect alignment of policies and resources with the assumed vision, a coherent and long-term approach supported by credibility, by including legitimacy factors, thus achieving a certain ethical quality. This is the distinctive element of superpolitics.

For these reasons, from a personal perspective, superpolitik operates more in the logic of Grand Strategy, as they share a common challenge: imposing an air of rationality in the persistent pursuit of the state’s objectives. Therefore, the essence of grand strategy lies in superpolitics, „that is, in the ability of a nation’s leaders to bring together all elements, military and non-military, necessary for maximizing the long-term (i.e., both in peacetime and wartime) interests of a nation” (Kennedy, 1991, p.5).

From this perspective, if Grand Strategy is „the highest type of strategy,” then Superpolitik becomes the most important task of governance [4].

Final Reflections

This book has all the qualities to become a trailblazer in the dimension of strategic thinking, advocating for new research and reflection directions that lead to a new strategic culture in the Romanian space.

The work proves its particularity and innovative character in the Romanian thinking

Bibliographical sources

GRAY, C. (2010). Războiul, pacea și relațiile internaționale. O introducere în istoria strategică. Iași: Polirom

KENNEDY, P.M. (1991). Grand strategies in war and peace New Haven: Yale University Press

SARTORI, G. (1999). Teoria democrației reinterpretată. (trad. Doru Pop). Iaşi: Polirom

References

[1] „It would be useful to reflect on the terms of a new type of strategic thinking, which somehow combines the traditional elements of geopolitics and classic power play with those concerning the increasingly complex relationship between cognitive and material factors, between power and knowledge, which operate in an increasingly fluid, increasingly unpredictable international system.” MAIOR, G. (2014). Incertitudine. Gândire strategică și relații internaționale în secolul XXI, Bucharest: Rao, p. 47.

[2] MILL, J.S. (1843). A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive.

[3] Politics should be realistic; politics should be idealistic: two principles that are true when they complement each other and are erroneous when they are separated. (M. Bluntschli, in Sartori, 1999, p. 59).

[4] Moreover, the term Grand Strategy is synonymous with the old-fashioned but still useful term ‘statecraft’. (Gray, 2010, p. 319).

[5] MAIOR, G. C. (2014). Superpolitica. Filosofia şi practica puterii în conducerea strategică a statului. Revista Sinteza, https://www.revistasinteza.ro/superpolitica-filosofia-si-practica-puterii-in-conducerea-strategica-a-statului